In this paper we show that interest rate rules lead to multiple equilibria when the central bank faces a limit to its ability to print money, or when private agents are limited in the amount of bonds that can be pledged to the central bank in exchange for money. Some of the equilibria are familiar and common to the environments where limits to money growth are not considered. However, new equilibria emerge, where money growth and inflation are higher. These equilibria involve a run on the central bank's interest target: households borrow as much as possible from the central bank, and the shadow interest rate in the private market is different from the policy target.
Introduction
Until the last couple of years, most central banks around the world conducted monetary policy by setting targets for short-term interest rates, and letting the quantity of money adjust in response to demand. Maneuvering interest rates as a way to achieve low and stable inflation is now regarded as a success story. Yet this was not always the case. As mentioned by Sargent [8] , * For valuable suggestions, we thank Fernando Alvarez, Gadi Barlevy, Robert Barsky, Mariacristina De Nardi, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Thomas J. Sargent the German Reichsbank also discounted treasury and commercial bills at fixed nominal interest rates in 1923; but, rather than contributing to stabilizing the value of the mark, the policy added fuel to the hyperinflation by causing the Reichsbank to greatly increase the money supply and transferring this money to the government and to those private entities lucky enough to borrow from the Reichsbank at the official discount rate. In our paper, we study the extent to which setting a short-term interest rate can be used as a way of implementing a unique equilibrium in a monetary economy.
We start our analysis in a simple environment where both the central bank and Treasury trade with all agents in the economy in every period and prices are flexible. In this setup, we consider the properties of an interest rate rule, whereby the central bank sets a price at which private agents are free to trade currency for one-period debt; this price need not be fixed, but rather may depend in arbitrary ways on all the information that the central bank has at the moment it makes its decision. We show that setting a policy rate in this way leads to multiple equilibria when the central bank faces a limit to its ability to print money, or when private agents are limited in the amount of bonds that can be pledged to the central bank in exchange for money. Some of the equilibria are familiar and common to the environments where limits to money growth are not considered. However, new equilibria emerge, where money growth and inflation are higher. These equilibria involve a run on the central bank's interest target: households borrow as much as possible from the central bank, and the shadow interest rate in the private market is different from the policy target.
To the extent that monetary policy is primarily conducted by open market operations that exchange money for government bonds (or government-backed bonds), fiscal policy plays a prominent role in defining the characteristics of equilibria that feature runs. This happens because the amount of bonds held by the private sector determines the size of the run in the event of a run. This is a new channel by which excessive deficits threaten price stability, and is independent of the familiar unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace [9] and the fiscal theory of the price level (Leeper [6] , Sims [10] , Woodford [11] ). In fact, we deliberately rule out these alternative channels of monetary-fiscal interaction by postulating fiscal rules that ensure long-term budget balance independently of the path of inflation.
Our research implies that interest-rate targets are an incomplete description of the way modern central banks have succeeded in establishing low and stable inflation, and suggests a new role for the "twin-pillar" doctrine of paying attention to monetary aggregates (both broad and narrow) as well as interest rates in designing appropriate monetary policy rules. 1 
The basic cash-in-advance model
Consider a version of the cash-in-advance model. There are a continuum of households of unit mass and a government/monetary authority. Time is discrete with dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. In each period, the timing is as follows: First, households pay lump sum nominal taxes T t levied by the government and asset markets open. In these asset markets, households can buy (or sell) government bonds, acquire money, as well as trade zero-net supply securities with other households. At this same time, the government can print and destroy money, borrow and lend.
After the asset markets, a goods market opens. In the goods market, households produce the consumption good using their own labor for the use of other households (but, as usual, not their own household) and the government. Each household has one unit of time and a constantreturns-to-scale technology that converts units of time into units of the consumption good one for one. Households use money to purchase units of the consumption good produced by other households. The government uses either money or bonds (it is immaterial which) to purchase G t = G ∈ (0, 1) units of the consumption good.
Let M t denote the amount of money in circulation at the end of the asset market in period t, after taxes are paid. Let B t−1 be the nominal amount of government bonds payable at date t.
(If B t−1 < 0 this implies households have agreed to pay the government B t−1 dollars at date t.)
The households start with initial nominal claims W −1 against the government.
2
Consider a price sequence {P t , R t ,R t } ∞ t=0 , where P t is the nominal price of a unit of the consumption good at date t, R t is the nominal risk-free rate between period t and t + 1 at which the government trades with private agents, andR t is the rate at which households trade with each other. A government policy {T t , M t , B t } ∞ t=0 is said to be feasible given {P t , R t ,R t } ∞ t=0 if for all t > 0
with the initial condition
In what follows, we use lower-case letters to indicate individual household choices and uppercase variables to indicate aggregates: as an example, m t are individual money holdings, and M t are aggregate money holdings. In equilibrium, lower and upper-case variables will coincide, since we consider a representative household.
Households are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint: their consumption must be purchased with money. A household's path is given by {c t , y t ,b t , b t , m t } ∞ t=0 , whereb t are holdings of privatelyissued bonds maturing in period t + 1.
3 In addition, households are potentially constrained in their holdings of government securities to a set B t . We will first explore the case in which B t is the entire real line, and we will then explore the implications of setting a limit to private indebtedness against the government.
A household path is feasible if for all t > 0
together with the initial condition
and the no-Ponzi condition
3 In equilibrium,b t ≡ 0.
Equation (6) imposes that households cannot borrow more than the present value of working 1 unit of time while consuming nothing, holding no money in every period after t, and maximally exploiting any price discrepancy between government-issued and private securities. This present value is evaluated at the sequence of intertemporal prices {R s } ∞ t=0 . When B t = R, a no-arbitrage condition will ensureR t+j = R t+j , making the corresponding term disappear from (6) . When limits to household indebtedness against the government are present, we will study equilibria where government securities have a different price than equivalent privately-issued securities, in which case household can profit from the mispricing (at the expense of the government), and the corresponding profits are part of their budget resources. 4 Facing
, and given initial nominal wealth, a household's problem is to choose {c t , y t ,
subject to (3), (4), (5), (6) , and b t ∈ B t . We assume that u is continuously differentiable, that both consumption and leisure are normal goods, and that the following conditions hold:
and
Equation (8) is a standard Inada condition; it will ensure an interior solution to our problem. Equation (9) imposes that the marginal disutility of labor is bounded away from zero in equilibria in which production is also bounded away from zero.
An interest rate policy
In this section, we construct equilibria for an economy in which the government/monetary authority sets an interest rate rule, without imposing limits to household trades with the central bank. In particular, suppose the central bank offers to buy or sell any amount of promises to pay $1 at date t + 1 for 1/(1 + R t ) < 1 dollars at date t. 5 This interest rate R t can be an arbitrary function of past history, and B t = R.
We suppose that the government sets a "Ricardian" fiscal rule, i.e., a rule such that the set of equilibrium price levels is not restricted by the requirement of the present-value budget constraint of the government. We choose such a fiscal policy because we are interested in the set of equilibria that can arise when money is not directly backed by tax revenues, as it happens when the fiscal theory of the price level holds. We will specify a class of fiscal rules that satisfies sufficient conditions for this requirement below.
An equilibrium is then a sequence
solves the household's problem taking {P t ,R t , R t , T t } ∞ t=0 as given, and such that markets clear for all t ≥ 0:
In order for the household problem to have a finite solution, it is necessary that the prices of government and private assets be the same:
When (12) fails, households can exploit the difference in price to make infinite profits. In addition to (6) and (12), necessary and sufficient conditions from the household optimization problem yield the following conditions for all t ≥ 0:
and the transversality condition
Substituting (10) and (12) into (13), we obtain
We now turn to constructing equilibria. The initial price level, P 0 , is not determined. For each initial price P 0 , one can use the interest rate rule R t and equations (1), (2), (10), (14), (15), and (17) to sequentially solve for a unique candidate equilibrium allocation and price system.
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That is, given R 0 , the fiscal policy rule determines T 0 , equation (17) (17) solves then for C 1 and equation (10) for (14) can be solved for P 1 , and equation (15) for M 1 . Equation
(1) then yields B 1 , and from there the process continues to period 2 and on.
To verify whether the candidate equilibrium allocation and price system we derived above is an equilibrium, we need only to check that the household transversality and no-Ponzi conditions (6) and (16) hold. To this end, we first restrict fiscal policy to a (broad) class which ensures the policy is Ricardian, and second, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 imposes an upper bound on nominal interest rates. The appendix studies more general cases where Assumption 1 is not necessary; in those cases, it may not be possible to find equilibria with a perfectly anticipated run on the central bank's interest rate peg, such as the one we will study in section 4, but there will instead be equilibria where runs occur with positive probability. 6 The Inada condition and the assumptions of normal goods ensure that an interior solution can be found and that (17) is strictly monotone in C t . In our analysis, we do not rule out explosive paths, for the reasons highlighted in Cochrane [3] .
The role of Assumption 1 is to ensure that the amount of seigniorage revenues that the government can raise remains bounded, which (together with the path of fiscal policy specified below) ensures that the household budget constraint is well specified.
As a specific example of Ricardian fiscal policy, we assume T t satisfies Assumption 2 There exist finite B > 0 and T such that
, and
Essentially, we require that if real debt is neither too high nor too low, taxes may be any function of past information subject only to a uniform bound in real terms. But when real debt exceeds a threshold (in absolute value), taxes cover at least a fraction α of debt, putting the brakes to a debt spiral.
We relegate the proof that (6) and (16) hold (and thus the candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium) to the appendix.
In the construction we just completed, P 0 is indeterminate, but once a value of P 0 is specified, there exists a unique equilibrium allocation and price system. Moreover, whenever the nominal rate set by the central bank is low, so is inflation. In particular, if
inflation is exactly zero in all periods.
The appendix considers a more general case, in which uncertainty is present and sunspot equilibria may arise (particularly if assumption 1 is retained). But, even in that case, a low official interest rate translates into a limit on expected inflation. Moreover, if a bound on deflation is imposed, a law of large numbers implies that average inflation in the limit will be low as long as the central bank keeps a commitment to low interest rates. (And again, if R t = 1 β − 1 for all t ≥ 0, then average inflation in the limit is exactly zero with probability one.)
In the next section, we show that a very different type of equilibrium emerges when households are not allowed to borrow unlimited funds from the central bank. In these equilibria, a low interest rate set by the central bank may well lead to high inflation instead.
Limits to Central Bank Lending
Suppose now we impose the additional constraint on the households that B t ≥ 0, t ≥ 0: households are not allowed to borrow from the government/central bank (or, equivalently, they are allowed to borrow from the central bank only by posting government bonds as collateral). That the borrowing limit be precisely zero is not central to our analysis, but simplifies exposition somewhat. In this section, we construct additional deterministic equilibria which do not exist
With the no-borrowing limit we just imposed, the official rate R t only becomes a lower bound for the private-sector rateR t . When households are at the borrowing limit with the central bank, private nominal interest rates may exceed the official rate. The no-arbitrage condition
All other equilibrium conditions remain the same, except that the private rateR t replaces the government rate R t in equation (17):
The allocation of section 3 remains part of an equilibrium even when the central bank limits its lending, provided that households have nonnegative bond holdings in all periods. For a given sequence of prices, interest rates, consumption and work levels, household holdings of government debt in this equilibrium depend on the sequence of taxes. Government debt will be strictly positive in each period t > 0 if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
whereĉ(R) is the consumption implied by equation (19) whenR t = R andû y (R) := u y (ĉ(R), G+ c(R)). It is straightforward to see that there are fiscal rules that satisfy (20) and Assumption 2. We assume that fiscal policy is run by one such rule. 7 As an example, choose
and α ∈ (0, 1).
In period 0, government debt will be nonnegative if
An interior equilibrium will only exist if
which we will assume. While P 0 can take any positive value in section 3, now equation (21) imposes a ceiling.
Additional Equilbria: A Single Run
The simplest equilibrium that may arise when a limit to private indebtedness is introduced is a run on government debt where B s = 0 for a single date s > 0. We now provide conditions under which such an equilibrium exists.
Assumption 3 Define
We assume that fiscal policy satisfies the following stronger version of (20):
Equation (20) guarantees that in each period there are positive bonds that can be converted into money and initiate a speculative run. The stronger condition (23) ensures that, after a period in which a run occurred and thus previous government debt was monetized, there are enough new bonds for the economy to return to a path where households hold positive amounts of government debt and equation (14) holds.
t=0 be determined as in the equilibrium of section 3, with P 0 satisfying (21), and let fiscal policy satisfy Assumption 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a different (deterministic) equilibrium in which B s = 0 is that the following equation admits a solution forR s > R s :
A sufficient condition (based on preferences alone) for (24) to have a solution withR s > R s is
Proof: The proof works by construction. Starting from an arbitrary price level P 0 that satisfies (21), the equilibrium allocation, price system, and government policy are solved as in section 3 up to period s − 1. Specifically, we use the interest rate rule R t and the fiscal policy rule with equations (10), (14), (15), and (17) to sequentially solve for the unique candidate equilibrium allocation and price system.
In period s, in order forR s > R s to be an equilibrium, the constraint B s ≥ 0 must be binding, which implies
Furthermore, equations (14) and (19) require
Substituting (26) From period s+1 onwards, the allocation and price system is once again uniquely determined (sequentially) by the interest rate rule R t , the fiscal policy rule, and equations (10), (14), (15), and (17). Equation (23) ensures that the resulting sequence for government debt is strictly positive. Once again, the proof that (6) and (16) hold is relegated to the general proof in the appendix.
Finally, to verify the sufficient condition (25), setR s = R s . Equations (14) and (20) imply
Since |û y (R)|(1 + R)ĉ(R) is a continuous function of R, when equation (25) holds, equation (28) ensures the existence of a solution of (24) withR s > R s . QED.
To be concrete, consider the following numerical example. Let the monetary authority set
− 1, where β = 1/1.01, for all t and all histories (and thus we can set R = 
Thus we assume T t = .5(B t−1 + M t−1 ) − 1.12P t−1 which satisfies (29) whenever B t−1 + M t−1 > 0 (which holds throughout the example). Finally, assume P 0 = 1 and W −1 = 2.57.
Given these assumptions, one equilibrium of this economy is a steady state: In each period t ≥ 0, P t = 1, C t = M t = .96, Y t = 1.06 and B t = 1.5. And for the given P 0 , when households have an unlimited ability to borrow from the government, this is the unique deterministic equilibrium.
Next suppose households face a restriction that B t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Then, the following is a deterministic equilibrium for any date s > 0. To see why this is an equilibrium, notice first that, when the run occurs, all government debt is converted into money; this largely increases the money supply. Furthermore, if a run occurs, then the private-sector interest rateR t must be greater than the interest rate set by the central bank, which is constant at 1/β − 1. The intratemporal optimality condition (19) implies that consumption decreases in period s when the run occurs. With consumption down and the money supply up, the price level must jump up so that the (binding) cash-in-advance constraint holds. Whether such a candidate allocation can be supported as an equilibrium depends on whether these changes can be made consistent with the household Euler equations for leisure and consumption, which are respectively (14) and
Specifically, in order to have a perfectly anticipated run in period s (and not before), it must be the case that households are willing to lend to the government in period s − 1 (i.e.,R Less curvature in u c (c, c + G) has an ambiguous effect, since (for givenR s ) it creates a bigger drop in consumption, but it also implies a greater intertemporal elasticity of consumption. The second effect turns out to be the relevant one, so that a perfectly anticipated run can happen when the curvature is low and hence the functionĉ is not very responsive to R. From these observations, we can thus understand the role of assumption A2. We can also understand why a run can happen under much weaker assumptions if it occurs with probability smaller than one, as described in the appendix: in this case, the potentially negative effect of a run on the households' willingness to save between periods s − 1 and s is tempered by the lower probability of the occurrence. In the limit, as the probability of a run goes to 0, households are content to save at the rate 1/β − 1 between periods s − 1 and s when the no-run allocation remains at the steady state throughout. work. Both of these channels imply that the interest rate offered by the government within the equilibrium allocation is too low for households to be willing to lend to the government, and that the private-market interest rate that justifies the labor decision is instead higher. Similarly, on the consumption side (where the relevant margin is once again shifted one period forward), households look forward to an increase in consumption between periods s and s + 1, and hence they require a higher real interest rate to be willing to save than the one offered by the government. This is particularly true because further inflation occurs between periods s and s + 1, as we establish next, in our discussion of how the run ends.
After the run ends, households resume lending to the government at the rate R s+1 = 1/β − 1 in period s + 1. With a fixed nominal interest rate, inflation between period s and s + 1 must adjust so that households find it optimal to increase their labor supply between the crisis period s and the return to normalcy in period s + 1. By equation (14), this requires further inflation between periods s and s + 1. The increase in both prices and production (and consumption)
between periods s and s + 1 implies that money supply must also grow. Since the crisis wiped out government debt, households cannot acquire this additional money by selling government debt. While part of the money can be acquired through the sales of output to the government in period s, a crisis will also require that fiscal policy generates new nominal liabilities through a tax cut at the beginning of period s + 1, as implied by Assumption 3.
From that point onward, output and consumption return to their pre-run steady state, while government debt (in real terms) converges back to the steady state gradually.
The importance of fiscal policy
Note that, when we restrict discussion to Ricardian fiscal policies and equilibria without borrowing limits, fiscal policy is irrelevant in determining equilibrium consumption and labor levels. (In fact, this is the entire point of Ricardian equivalence.) For run equilibria, this is no longer the case.
To see this, consider the run equilibria of the previous section, but with a different tax policy. In 
Other Equilibria
By repeating the steps outlined in section 4.1, it is easy to construct equilibria in which runs occur repeatedly, and it is also possible to construct equilibria in which runs last for more than one period. The conditions under which such equilibria exist are similar to those for a single run (in particular, Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are sufficient conditions). In more general cases, the appendix considers stochastic equilibria, where runs can emerge with probability less than 1.
In the simple setup that we described, a run on an interest peg triggers immediate monetization of all of the government debt. This may be a good description of the experience of the Reichsbank during the German hyperinflation, but it is unlikely that a run would suddenly appear in this form in an economy that has previously experienced stable inflation and macroeconomic conditions. In practice, the unfolding of a run would be slowed by a number of frictions that may prevent households from immediately demanding cash for all of their government bond holdings; these frictions may take the form of limited participation in bond markets (see e.g.
Grossman and Weiss [5] , Alvarez and Atkeson [1] , and Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond [2] ), noisy information about other households' behavior, or the presence of long-term bonds whose price is not pegged by the central bank.
Discussion
In this paper, we have shown that considering bounds on open market operations may be crucial in determining the size of the set of monetary equilibria under interest rate rules. Policies which have unique equilibria in environments with no bounds may instead have many new equilibria when bounds are introduced. The particular bound we studied was on the size of privately held government debt -we assumed it must not be negative.
Suppose instead we had assumed that if a run is seen as occurring, the monetary authority stops it by not letting, say, government debt fall below 90% of its previous value. That is, the central bank abandons the interest rate peg at that point. Then, of course, it is impossible for debt to go to zero in one period as in our examples. On the other hand, the same logic as our examples still holds, except that the lower bound on debt is no longer zero, but 90% of its previous value. What causes these additional equilibria is the existence of the bounds themselves, not their particular values.
These questions are particularly important in the wake of quantitative easing. In our model, we do not distinguish between the monetary authority and the fiscal authority. In our run equilibrium, in essence, the monetary authority monetizes the debt. If that monetary authority
proposed to limit such a run by not letting debt fall below 90% of its previous value, it could do this by simply not buying government debt at some point. With quantitative easing, however, central banks themselves now owe large debts to private institutions in the form of excess bank reserves. We interpret excess reserves in our model to be part of B t , not M t , since in equilibrium they must pay the market rate of interest. While a central bank can refuse to turn government debt into cash by simply not purchasing it, it is unclear to us how a central bank can refuse to turn excess reserves into cash without explicitly or implicitly defaulting. Thus the dangers we outline in this paper may be more relevant now than ever.
A Analysis of the General Stochastic Case

A.1 The Environment with Sunspots
We modify the environment described in section 2 by introducing a sunspot variable s t in each period. Without loss of generality, s t is i.i.d. with a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Its realization at time t is observed before any action takes place. All variables with a time-t subscript are allowed to be conditional on the history of sunspot realizations {s j } t j=1 . We assume that the government only trades in one-period risk-free debt, but we allow the households to trade state-contingent assets, and we denote by a t+1 the amount of nominal claims that a household purchases in period t maturing in period t + 1 (conditional on the sunspot realization s t+1 ). Without uncertainty, a t+1 ≡b t . Equation (3) is thus replaced by
where Q t+1 is the stochastic discount factor of the economy. For the later analysis, it is convenient to defineR t := 1/E t Q t+1 − 1. This definition is consistent with the notation that we used in the main text for the deterministic case:R t is the one-period nominal risk-free rate in the market for private credit.
In period 0, the household budget constraint becomes
The no-Ponzi condition (6) generalizes to
With these changes, an equilibrium is defined as in section 3; the market-clearing condition (11) becomes
The conditions characterizing an equilibrium are given by (10), (15), (19), (34), the stochastic
the transversality condition, which in the stochastic case becomes
and finally the no-arbitrage condition for interest rates. This last condition statesR t = R t when B = R and (18) when B t ≥ 0 is imposed.
In the main text, we adopted Assumption 1 to ensure that seigniorage revenues remain bounded and hence that the present-value budget constraint of the households is well defined.
When Assumption 1 is violated, such as in the case of Taylor rules that have no upper bound on the interest rate, an alternative (sufficient) condition that we can adopt is given by
Notice that Assumption 4 is incompatible with the sufficient condition (25) in Proposition 1.
When Assumption 4 is adopted, often perfectly anticipated runs will fail to exist (but probabilistic runs will continue to occur). We prove this proposition in 3 steps. First, we prove that A t+1 , as defined in (33), is well defined. Second, we prove that (36) holds, and finally that (33) holds.
A.2.1 A t+1 is well defined.
We work backwards on the individual components of the sum defining A t+1 in equation (33).
From (18) we obtain
Next, use (35) to get
Equation (39) implies
10 If the borrowing limit is not 0, the expression in (38) would not be 0, but it can be proven that A t+1 is nonetheless well defined. 11 We can interchange the order of the sum and the expectations since all elements of the sum have the same sign.
which proves that the second piece of the infinite sum defining A t+1 is well defined. From Assumption 2, we have |T t+j+1 | ≤ T P t+j + |B t+j |, and so
We analyze equation (41) in pieces. Using (40), we have
To work on the sum of debt, notice first that equation (1) continues to hold even if we replace R t byR t . This is because B t = 0 in the periods and states of nature in whichR t > R t . If 
We can then use (1), (15), (35), and (43) to get
Using (39) and (44), we obtain (for j > 1)
Using (45) we get
Collecting all terms, equations (40), (42), and (46) imply
A.2.2 Equation (36) holds.
Use (45) to obtain
We then use (35), (47), and (48) to prove
Equations (11), (48), and (49) imply (16).
A.2.3 Equation (33) holds.
The same steps used to prove (48) can also be used to prove
As previously noted, equation (1) continues to hold even if we replace R t withR t , since the two values only differ when B t = 0. We can then iterate (1) forward, taking expectations conditional on time-t + 1 information, and use (50) to obtain
which completes the proof. Equation (51) relies on G < 1 (government spending must be less than the maximum producible output) and on
This completes the proof of proposition 2.
B Other Equilibria of the Stochastic Economy
B.1 A Probabilistic Run in Period s > 0.
The perfectly anticipated run described in section 4.1 relies on strong assumptions about preferences. As an example, if we assume that preferences are given by u(c t , y t ) =
an equilibrium will always fail to exist for σ ≤ 1, since a solution to (24) cannot be found (witĥ R > R). Nonetheless, even for these preferences other equilibria exist, provided that the occurrence of a run is sufficiently small. Moreover, these equilibria exist even when the central bank sets no upper bound to its interest rate (provided, of course, that preferences are such that the present value of seigniorage remains finite). As was the case in section 4.1, fiscal policy plays an important role in ensuring that households have enough nominal wealth to acquire their desired money balanced, and we assume that (23) holds.
We now construct an equilibrium where a run occurs in period s with probability φ ∈ (0, 1).
Starting from an arbitrary initial price level P 0 , we construct recursively a deterministic allocation and price system up to period t − 1 as we did in section 4.1. For period s, we consider an equilibrium with just two realizations of the allocation and price level: with probability φ, the price level is P 
Given any arbitrary valueR H s > R s , and given the predetermined time-s − 1 variables and the fiscal policy rule for T s , equation (52) can be solved for P H s /P s−1 , the level of inflation that will occur if a run on the interest rate peg materializes in period s. As was the case in section 4.1, sincê c is a decreasing function and taxes satisfy (20), inflation in the event of a run will necessarily be strictly greater than inflation in the equilibrium in which no run can take place.
To determine P 
Generically, this equation can be solved for P L s /P s−1 . However, we need to ensure that the solution is nonnegative, and that it entails nonnegative bond holdings, i.e., that
A sufficient condition for both is that φ be sufficiently small.
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Ifû y does not decline too fast with R, then equation (53) will imply that P L s /P s−1 is lower than in the deterministic equilibrium with no runs. Because of this, the possibility of a run may cause the central bank to under shoot inflation while the run is not occurring, further undermining inflation stability.
From period s onwards, the characterization of the equilibrium proceeds again deterministically and recursively, separately for the branch that follows P 
B.2 Recurrent Runs
We can generalize the example of subsection B.1 to construct equilibria in which runs can occur in any number of periods. As an example, there are equilibria in which runs occur with i.i.d. probability φ in each period. Once again, we construct the allocation and price system recursively, as we did in section B.1. In each period t, the history of runs up to period t − 1 is taken as given, and (52) and (53) are used to solve for P H t /P t−1 and P L t /P t−1 .
12 Note that, as φ → 0, P L s /P s−1 converges to the inflation in the deterministic equilibrium with no runs, where (20) guarantees that (54) holds.
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